Land & Water Law Review
Volume 32

Issue 2

Article 3

1997

Reserving Wildlife for Resident Consumption: Is the Dormant
Commerce Clause the Outfitters' White Knight
Peter C. Nicolaysen

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water

Recommended Citation
Nicolaysen, Peter C. (1997) "Reserving Wildlife for Resident Consumption: Is the Dormant Commerce
Clause the Outfitters' White Knight," Land & Water Law Review: Vol. 32 : Iss. 2 , pp. 125 - 153.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol32/iss2/3

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Land & Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Law Archive of Wyoming
Scholarship.

Nicolaysen: Reserving Wildlife for Resident Consumption: Is the Dormant Comme

Comment
RESERVING WILDLIFE FOR RESIDENT
CONSUMPTION: Is the Dormant Commerce
Clause the Outfitters' White Knight?,
INTRODUCTION

Proper management of big game animals2 requires that Wyoming
annually issue a limited number of big game hunting licenses. Wyoming
issues two types of licenses: general and limited quota licenses. 3 The
Wyoming Game and Fish Commission (Commission)4 determines how
many limited quota licenses will be available in each limited quota hunting area based upon animal population and conservation goals.' Of these
licenses, the Commission allocates eighty-four percent of limited quota
elk licenses and eighty percent of limited quota deer, antelope, and wild
turkey licenses to Wyoming residents, 6 with the corresponding sixteen and

1. The author owns partial interests in a Wyoming game-bird farm and a Wyoming deer and
antelope outfitting business.
2. In Wyoming. "Big game animal[s]" include antelope, bighorn sheep, deer, elk, moose and
mountain goat. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 23-1-101(a)(i) (Michie 1977).
3. Wyoming defines a general license as "a big or trophy game license valid in any hunt area
which is not limited by quota. General licenses are valid only under species, sex, age class and harvest limitations which are in effect for each hunt area." Game & Fish Commission, WYO. REG. CH.
XLIV, § 2(c) (1996). Wyoming defines a limited quota license as "a license limited in number and
valid only in a specified area or a portion of an area, for a specified sex or species of big or trophy
game or wild turkey during specified season dates." Id. § 2(h).
4. The Commission consists of seven appointed commissioners; the governor serves as an ex
officio member. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 23-1-201 (Michie 1977). Only four of the seven appointed commissioners may be of the same political party. Id. Commissioners are appointed by the governor with
the advice and consent of the Wyoming Senate for terms of six years. Id. The governor has the power
toremove a commissioner. Id. § 202.
5. WYO. STAT. ANN. j 23-1-103 (Michie 1977). The Wyoming Legislature delegated rulemaking authority to the Wyoming Game and Fish Commission to issue and regulate the licensing of
wildlife in the State of Wyoming. WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-1-302(a) (xiv),(xxii) (Michie Supp.
1996). Wyoming statute also explicidy provides that the Commission may limit the number of resident or nonresident big or trophy game animal licenses. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 23-1-703(a) (Michie
Supp. 1996).
6. Game & Fish Commission, WYo. REG. Cit. XLIV, § 6 (1996).
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twenty percent to nonresidents. 7 Individuals wishing to hunt in a
limited quota area in Wyoming choose a hunting area and submit their
application to the Wyoming Game and Fish Department (Department).8 If
the number of applications for a limited quota area exceeds the number of
available licenses for that area, a competitive drawing randomly selects
successful applicants who are then issued a license. 9
Hunters who are unfamiliar with a hunting area often procure the
services of an outfitter or guide to increase their chances for a successful
hunt." Nonresidents are less likely than residents to be familiar with a
hunting area and generally, for economic reasons, have a shorter period
2 Thus, hunters who hire a professional
of time to hunt."
guide are usually
3
nonresidents.

1

7. Game & Fish Commission, Wyo. REG. CH. XLIV, § 6 (1995). In the 1996 REGULATIONs
FOR ISSUANCE OF LICENSES, the Commission has omitted the paragraph that allocates sixteen and

twenty percent of licenses to nonresidents. Game & Fish Commission, WYo. REG. CH. XLIV, § 7
(1996). However, Section 6 of the 1996 regulations continues to provide the same allocation percentage to residents, and thus, the allocation percentages to nonresidents also remains at sixteen and
twenty percent.
Nonresident limited quota licenses are further divided into regular and special license types.
Game & Fish Commission, WYo. REG. CH. XLIV, § 7(c) (1996). Special licenses are defined as
"those licenses having a fee greater than that of a regular nonresident elk, deer or antelope license as
defined in [WYO. STAT. ANN. § 23-2-101 (f)(i),(ii),(iii) (Michie Supp. 1996)1." Id. § 2(r). Forty percent of the nonresident allocation are special licenses. Id. § 7(c). The remaining sixty percent are
regular licenses. Id. The purpose of this higher-priced license is to decrease demand, thereby increasing a nonresident's chance to draw a license. Game & Fish Department, BIG GAME LICENSE ALLOCATION - SITUATION ANALYSIS (hereinafter, "SITUATION ANALYSIS"), at 2 (1995).

When the Commission began analyzing Wyoming's licensing system in mid-1995, the Game
and Fish Department presented a summary of the license allocation issues to the Commission on July
10, 1995. Id. at 6. This SrrUATION ANALYSIS acknowledged the sources of controversy surrounding
license allocation and need for resolution. Id. at 4-5.
8. Game & Fish Commission, WYO. REG. CH. XLIV, HI 2(b), 5, 7 (1996).
9. Id. §§ 5(a), 7(a) (1996).
10. For the purposes of this work, the terms "outfitters" and "guides" will be used interchangeably.
11. In addition to employing an outfitter because of a lack of familiarity with the hunting area,
hunters often employ an outfitter because of the services, other than guiding, that an outfitter provides. Interview with Steve Sheaffer, Licensed Wyoming Outfitter and President of Professional
Recreational Outfitters of Wyoming, in Arlington, Wyo., (Mar. 12, 1996) (hereinafter, "Sheaffer
Interview, (Mar. 12, 1996)"). These outfitting services include providing lodging, transportation,
food, hunting equipment and other supplies. Id.
12. Id. Wyoming law also prohibits nonresidents from hunting big game on "any designated
wilderness area ... unless accompanied by a licensed professional guide or a resident guide" and
provides that the "commission may also specify other areas of the state.., for which a licensed
professional or resident guide is required for nonresidents, for purposes of proper game management,
protection of hunter welfare and safety, or better enforcement of game fish laws." WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 23-2-401(a) (Michie Supp. 1996).
13. Sheaffer Interview, (Mar. 12, 1996). This pattern of nonresident guide use seems to be
consistent throughout the United States. Telephone Interview with George Taulman, United States
Outfitters, Inc., Taos, N.M. (Sept. 7, 1996); Telephone Interview with Ken Church, Blindfold Guide
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Wyoming's allocation system necessarily creates uncertainty about
whether a hunting applicant will draw a license, 4 and which area the
applicant will draw.' 5 Even though outfitting produces a significant
amount of revenue for Wyoming,' 6 outfitters find it difficult to engage in
business under this system because of these uncertainties.' T Wyoming's
system is so unpredictable that at least one outfitter, who does business
throughout the United States, has simply choosen to forego Wyoming's
relatively impenetrable market.' 8
The uncertainty of the allocation system compounded by the small
number of limited quota licenses allocated to nonresidents means that an
outfitter has practically no opportunity to establish a client base. 9 An
outfitter cannot establish a clientele because potential clients may not draw
hunting licenses. As a result, prior to each hunting season, the outfitter
must seek out new clients because the outfitter cannot rely on an established clientele. 20 After finding prospective clients, an outfitter must inform them that although the hunting is great, a nonresident's chance of
drawing a license is not. 2' All this makes the Wyoming outfitter and
Service, Kanab, Utah (Sept. 7, 1996); Telephone Interview with John Cole, Hunters Rendezvous,
Monument, Or. (Sept. 7, 1996); Telephone Interview with Lori Ginn, International Outdoor Consultants, Hamilton, Mont. (Sept. 7, 1996).
14. SITUATION ANALYSIS, supra note 7, at 1.
15. An applicant may list as many areas as space is provided for on the application. Game &
Fish Commission, Wyo. REG. CH. XLIV, §§ 5, 6 (1995).
16. Taking into account only the sales of outfitting services in Wyoming. the economic impact
from outfitting clients hunting in Wyoming exceeds forty-five million dollars. DAVID T. TAYLOR &
ROBERT R. FLETCHER, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE WYOMING OUrFITTING INDUSTRY: AN

UPDATE - 1993, at 4-6, (Jan. 1995).
17. Steve Sheaffer remarked that, in 1996, of his sixty potential elk hunting clients, only six
drew licenses; of his thiry-eight potential deer hunting clients, five drew licenses; and of his fortyfour potential antelope hunting clients, four drew licenses. Telephone Interview with Steve Sheaffer,
(July 10, 1996). See supra note 11 for qualifications.
18. A Montana outfitter and booking agent remarked that her company has no outfitter representatives in Wyoming because it is "impossible to draw tags." Telephone Interview with Lori Ginn,
Outfitter and Booking Agent, International Outdoor Consultants, Hamilton, Mont. (Sept. 7, 1996).
19. A recent article reported that Dick Sadler, a former Wyoming state legislator and an outspoken proponent of resident hunting interests, believes that the outfitting industry in Wyoming is
growing. David Boyd, Outfluer's Business Rests On Luck Of The Draw, CASPER STAR TRIB., Oct.
24, 1996, at El. Sadler contends that, based upon figures obtained from the Wyoming State Board of
Outfitters and Professional Guides, 'the number of outfitters in Wyoming stayed about the same
during the early '90s, but the number of elk hunters who use outfitters increased by about a third."
Id. at E5. However, Jane Flagg, Administrator of the Board of Outfitters and Professional Guides,

remarked that the number of hunters who use an outfitter has remained constant at around 10,000
over the last five years. Telephone Interview with Jane Flagg, Administrator. Wyoming State Board
of Outfitters and Professional Guides, Cheyenne, Wyo. (Nov. 1, 1996). The exact number of hunters
who use an outfitter for the years prior to 1995 was not available. Id.

20. See supra note 11.
21. In 1995, a total of 40,417 limited quota licenses were available to resident elk hunters.
Wyoming Game & Fish Department, RESIDENT ELK DEMAND INDEX, Mar. 3, 1996. Only 32,414
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hunting in Wyoming less attractive when the nonresident hunter can be.
assured a license in states surrounding Wyoming.'
Wyoming outfitters have long advocated changing the license allocation system so that drawing a nonresident license would be more certain. 23
Proposals include modifying the method of nonresident license draws'
and placing some of the resident licenses in the nonresident pool,' but
neither proposal has been popular with resident hunters.' Suggestions
which would diminish the number of resident licenses have polarized the
resident hunters and outfitters.'
Recent lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of Wyoming's
hunting laws 28 and the threat of future litigation have made resolving
the differences between outfitters and resident hunters an increasingly
important objective for the Commission.2 9 One attempt to resolve
these differences was the creation of the License Allocation Task
Force (Task Force), which was composed of various hunting inter-

applications were received. Id. Thus, a license was available for every applicant. In contrast, the 1995
figures show that 1,878 regular limited quota licenses were available to nonresident elk hunters, while
6,093 applications were received. Wyoming Game & Fish Department, NONRESIDENT ELK DEMAND
INDEX, Mar. 3, 1996. With respect to special limited quota licenses, 2013 licenses were available for
3,233 applicants. Id. Nonresidents, therefore, have only a 30.8 percent chance of drawing a regular
limited quota license and a 62.2 percent chance of drawing a special limited quota license.
22. For example, Montana and Idaho both provide licenses to nonresidents who contract to
hunt with an outfitter. IDAHO CODE § 36-408(c)(Supp. 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-2-511 (1995).
See Appendix, State Licensing Systems.
23. In 1989, the outfiting industry succesfully lobbied the Wyoming legislature fornonresident
license fee increases, intending that demand would decrease, thus improving the success rate. SrruATON
ANALYSIS, sWpra note 7, at 2. The results of this feeincrease have been mixed. Id. While the revenue for
the Game & Fish Department has icremased, there is still no assurance of drawing a license and every year
theDepartment receives numerous complairs from hunters because of price differentials. Id.
24. See infra
notes 166-172 and accompanying text.
25. See infra
note 163.
26. See infra
notes 164, 172 and accompanying text.
27. Dick Sadler remarked that the plaintiffs in Clajon ProductionCorp. v. Petera. 854 F.Supp.
843 (D. Wyo. 1994), who challenged Wyoming's licensing allocation system, "had better be careful
about raising the ire of the state's sportsmen." Tom Bishop, Suit Over Wildlife 'Dangerous'.CASPER
STAR TRIB., Aug. 29, 1993, at BI. Sadler stated that "[t]his could very well lead to punitive legislation this next session." Id.
28. SITUATION ANALYSIS, supra note 7, at 3. Since 1992, there have been three legal challenges to Wyoming's wildlife laws. Dorrance v.McCarthy, 957 F.2d 761 (10th Cir. 1992) (challenging
the constitutionality of Wyoming's ban on the private ownership and import of big game and trophy
animals); Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 854 F.Supp. 843 (D. Wyo. 1994) (challenging the constitutionality of Wyoming's license allocation system); Wyoming Coalition v. Wyoming Game & Fish
Comm'n, 875 P.2d 729 (Wyo. 1994) (challenging the constitutionality of the Commission's authority
to set hunting season dates).
29. Letter from Jim Geringer, Governor, Wyoming, to the Wyoming Game and Fish Commission, (Apr. 26, 1995) (requesting cooperation to find creative licensing allocation alternatives) (on
file with the Land and Water Law Review).
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ests.10 For approximately six months, the Task Force considered licensing alternatives and sought a solution to recommend to the Commission.3 ' This attempt failed; the Task Force could not reach a consensus on an alternative to the current big-game license allocation
system to recommend to the Commission.32
Unless Wyoming adopts an alternative to its license allocation system, 3 3 outfitters may once again resort to litigation.' This comment will
discuss how the dormant Commerce Clause might serve as a basis for a
legal challenge to the Wyoming license allocation system. First, United
States Supreme Court dormant Commerce Clause cases and the tests that
apply to Wyoming's allocation system will be reviewed. Second, it will
consider the ramifications of the Clajon Production Corp. v. Petera"
litigation on a future plaintiff. Third, it will analyze how Wyoming's
system fares against a dormant Commerce Clause challenge, including a
discussion of alternative licensing schemes. Finally, it will briefly address
the Wyoming Legislature's role in resolving the controversial hunting
license allocation issues.
BACKGROUND

Dormant Commerce Clause
Through the Commerce Clause the United States Constitution
grants Congress far-reaching regulatory power over interstate Com30. Te Deparunent appointed a task force to study license alocation ismes. Game
A& Fish Department, BIG GAME LICENSE ALLOCATiON TASK FORCE - A REPORT TO THE WYOMING GAME AND FISH
COMMISSION (hereinafler, "TASK FORCE REPORT"), at 6, The Task Force consisted of sixteen individuals:
four landowners, four outfitters, four sportsmen, two conservationists, and two non-voting Game and Fish
liaisons. Id. The Task Force's first meeting took place in January 1996. Id.
31. Id. at 6-14.
32. Id.at 14.
33. The Game and Fish Commission is hearing public comment on six proposals to improve
access and certainty in the allocation system, including a raffle system and a competitive bid or auction system. Dan Neal, G&F Looks At Paying For Private Access, CASPER STAR ThIn., Oct. 30,
1996, at Al. See infra notes 166-72 and accompanying text.
34. In 1993, outfitters and landowners brought a lawsuit against the Wyoming Game & Fish
Department challenging the constitutionality of the license allocation system. The Federal District
Court for the District of Wyoming granted summary judgment to the Department. Clajon Prod. Corp.

v. Petera, 854 F.Supp. 843 (D.Wyo. 1994). In 1995, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed
the plaintiffs' dormant Commerce Clause claim for a lack of standing. 70 F.3d 1566 (10th Cir. 1995).
See infra text accompanying notes 82-104. The plaintiffs' attorney, Jim Scarantino, stated that another
lawsuit would be brought to challenge the constitutionality of Wyoming's license allocation system.
Dan Neal, New Hunt License Suit On Horizn, CASPER STAR TRIB., Nov. 29, 1995, at Al.
35. 70 F.3d 1566 (10th Cir. 1995).
36. The United States Constitution provides that "the Congress shall have Power ... to regulate Commerce . . . among the several states." U.S. CoNSr. art. I. § 8, cl. 3.
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merce. 37 Even in the absence of congressional regulation, the Supreme
Court has, under the auspices of a "dormant" Commerce Clause, interpreted the Commerce Clause to prohibit state action38 that adversely
affects interstate commerce.39 States, however, may enact laws to protect
the health and safety of their citizens, even if these laws incidentally
burden interstate commerce. 40
37. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
38. Any law will be subject to the dormant Commerce Clause, regardless of whether the enacting legislative body is the state legislature, an administrative agency or a local government. E.g.,
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (state statute prohibiting the export of minnows); C & A
Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994) (municipal ordinance requiring
that all waste be deposited at designated waste station).
39. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
Commentators Rotunda and Nowak describe the dormant Commerce Clause power exercised
by the Court:
Whether or not the [federal] commerce power is exclusive or to what extent concurrent
state regulation may coexist in the absence of an articulated Congressional judgment is not
textually demonstratable. Moreover, the text of the commerce clause provides no overt restraint of state impingement of interstate commerce in the absence of Congressional legislation. It has been left to the Court to interpret, as inherent in that affirmative grant of power, self-executing limitations on the scope of permissible state regulation.
When the Court seeks to decide the extent of permissible state regulation in light of a
"dormant" commerce clause power, it is in effect attempting to interpret the meaning of
Congressional silence; the Court intervenes in an area where the primary power is that of
Congress.
RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK. TREATISE ON CONSITTUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND
PROCEDURE, § 11.1. at2 (2d 1992).
40. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey. 437 U.S. 617, 623-24 (1978) (holding that New Jersey's
statute, which prohibited the import of waste material into the state, violated the dormant Commerce

Clause). In addition to "health and safety" laws, two other situations may limit the reach of the dormant
Commerce Clause. First, when Congress "expressly state[s]" with "unmistakably clear" intent to limit the
applicability of the dormant Commerce Clause, the application of the dormant Commerce Clause may be
limited. South-Central Tmaber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91 (1984). In a second situation, a
state may regulate an area of commerce if it participates in that area of commerce. Id. at 97. The Supreme
Court limits this "market-participant" doctrine to the extent that a state may "impose budens on commerce
within the market in which it is a paiicipan, but allows it to go no further. The State may not impose
condins... that have a substantial regulatory effect outside of that particular market." Id. Neither excep-

tion applies with respect to Wyoming's license allocation system.
Congress has not expressly stated an intent to limit the applicability of the dormant Commerce Clause to Wyoming's wildlife hunting laws. The U.S. Supreme Court has considered this
exception as applied to the Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (1981), and a
state's right to regulate wildlife. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986). (The purposes of the Lacey

Act are "to strengthen and supplement state wildlife conservation laws [and] to promote the interests
of agriculture and horticulture by prohibiting the importation of certain types of wildlife determined to
be injurious to those interests." MICHAEL J. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW

105 (1983).) In Maine, the state argued that Congress, when it passed the Lacey Act Amendments of
1981, intended to lower the scrutiny applied to a discriminatory wildlife law under the dormant Commerce Clause. 477 U.S. at 139. The Supreme Court rejected Maine's argument. Id.
The market exception does not apply to Wyoming's license allocation system because Wyoming, in managing wildlife and allocating licenses, is not participating as an economic actor in the
outfitting market. See generally Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market ParticipationExemption to
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REV. 395, 441 (1989).
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The Supreme Court has developed tests for the two most commonly
challenged types of state laws: discriminatory laws and nondiscriminatory
laws. 4' If the Court concludes that a law is discriminatory, the law must
survive a heightened scrutiny analysis. 2 If the Court concludes that a law
is nondiscriminatory, it will apply a less rigorous "balancing" test.'
DiscriminatoryRegulations
A regulation discriminates against interstate commerce when it treats
in-state and out-of-state economic interests differently, benefitting residents and burdening nonresidents.' Discriminatory regulations are "virtually per se invalid, "45 unless the enacting jurisdiction shows a legitimate
interest supporting the regulation and a lack of any nondiscriminatory
alternatives.' Courts should use the "strictest scrutiny" when determining
the legitimacy of a discriminatory regulation.'
The Supreme Court recognizes two types of discriminatory regulations: those which "facially" discriminate and those which discriminate
"in effect."' Facially discriminatory regulations overtly impede interstate
commerce at the enacting jurisdiction's border.49 In Hughes v. Oklahoma,
the Supreme Court held unconstitutional an Oklahoma wildlife regulation
because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce. 50 The regulation prohibited the export of minnows for sale from Oklahoma."' Because the regulation explicitly prohibited the sale in other states of Okla-

41. City of Philadelphia. 437 U.S. at 624. The Supreme Court defines discrimination as "differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens
the latter." Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Oregon, 114 S. Ct. 1345, 1350 (1994) (holding that
Oregon's solid waste dumping surcharge was facially invalid under the dormant Commerce Clause
because it favored in-state economic interests while burdening their out-of-state counterparts).
42. Rotunda and Nowak explain the heightened scrutiny analysis:
If a state law discriminates against interstate commerce because of its interstate nature, the
state law should be held to be a per se violation of the dormant commerce clause. Because
the purpose of the state law is illegitimate, there is no real need for the Court to engage in
any balancing test.
ROTUNDA & NOWACK, supra note 39, § 11.8, at 31.
43. Id. at 24 (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)). See infra text
accompanying note 73.
44. Oregon Waste Systems, Inc., 114 S. Ct. at 1350.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1351.
47. Id.
48. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336.
49. Id. at 337.
50. Id. at 336-37.
51. Id. at 323. Oklahoma's regulation provided that "[n]o person may transport or ship minnows for sale outside the slate which were seined or procured within the waters of this state." Okla.
Stat. tit. 29, § 4-115(B) (1974), amended by Okla. Stat. tit. 29, § 4-115 (1981).
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homa goods 2 and allowed the same sales within Oklahoma, Oklahoma
discriminated against commerce occurring across state lines.5 3 Under the
applicable dormant Commerce Clause test,' Oklahoma attempted to show
that its regulation served the legitimate purpose of conservation, and that
it could not achieve this goal through nondiscriminatory alternatives. 55
The Court rejected Oklahoma's argument, holding that those outside
Oklahoma should not be required to bear the full burden of conserving
wildlife within Oklahoma "when equally effective nondiscriminatory
conservation measures are available. "'
A regulation discriminates "in effect" if it has the practical effect of
burdening interstate commerce. 5 ' For example, in C & A Carbone, Inc. v.
Town of Clarkstown, N.Y,5 the town of Clarkstown commissioned the
building of a solid waste transfer station to separate recyclable material

52. Central to the Court's reasoning was the decision that wildlife regulations are subject to the
same Commerce Clause standards as other natural resources. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 335.
53. Id. at 336-37.
54. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
55. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337-38.
56. Id. at 337. The Court noted that Oklahoma did not take alternative conservation measures
such as limiting the numbers of minnows that could be captured in Oklahoma or regulating the method of disposal or sale within Oklahoma. Id. at 338.
In many Supreme Court cases, the Court has stricken discriminatory laws when there are
existing alternatives. In Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356 (1951). the Court
held that Madison's ordinance, which prohibited the sale of milk labeled as pasteurized unless it had
been pasteurized within a radius of five miles from the central square of Madison, violated the dormant Commerce Clause. The Court remarked that "even in the exercise of its unquestioned power to
protect the health and safety of its people," a state may not discriminate against interstate commerce
"if reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives, adequate to conserve legitimate local interests, are
available." 1d. at 354. See also, Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333
(1977). In Hunt, the Court held unconstitutional North Carolina's apple grading system. Id. at 35354. Instead of banning the Washington State grade system, the Court stated that North Carolina could
have required all boxes of apples be marked with the USDA grade system or could have banned all
grading systems that could not be shown to be equal or superior to the USDA grade system. Id. at
354.
But see Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986). In Maine v. Taylor, the Court upheld a facially
discriminatory law against a dormant Commerce Clause challenge. Id. at 151. Maine's law banned the
import of live baitfish. Id. The purpose behind the law was to protect a Maine fish species from a parasite
feared to be living inside bakflsh. Id. Maine's discriminatory practice was justified because Main showed
that its law advanced a legitimate local Purpose unrelated to economic protectionism and could not be served
adequately by "available nondiscriminatory alternatives." Id. at 151. The Court rejected alternatives to
Maine's law, noting that proposed alternatives were only "'abstract possibilit[ies],'" Id. at 147 (quoting U.S.
v. Taylor, 585 F.Supp. 393, 398 (D. Me. 1984)). But see Government Suppliers Consolidating Sew., Inc.
v. Bayh, 753 F. Supp. 739, 771 (S.D. Ind. 1990) (holding that an Indiana statue. which regulated the
import and disposal of trash, violated the donmnt Commerce Clause and that the nondiscriminatory alternatives available to Indiana were reasonable).
57. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 350-51 (holding
that .the practical effect of the state regulation discriminated against interstate commerce).
58. 114 S. Ct. at 1680.
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from nonrecyclable material, and send the separated material to a recycling center or a landfill. 9 The town's station was built and operated by a
local private contractor.' After the station was built, the town adopted a
waste flow control ordinance requiring that all waste generated in town
and all imported waste be deposited at the transfer station. 61 The ordinance forbade local processors to ship waste out of Clarkstown.Y Instead,
they had to pay a fee to the designated transfer station to separate trash
that the local processors had already separated. 3 The town sued the petitioner, a local processor, for attempting to ship waste outside Clarkstown
without paying the designated transfer station fee.'
The Supreme Court ruled that the ordinance affected interstate commerce in its practical effect and design.' All processors, except the
town's transfer station, were denied access to Clarkstown's solid-waste
market.6 In addition, out-of-state interests who chose to dispose of their
waste through the petitioner and other local processors would have to pay
more for waste disposal because these processors would add the town's
transfer station fee to their disposal price.6' The town claimed that the
ordinance essentially imposed a quarantine that ensured safe garbage.'
Notwithstanding this argument, the Court found that the ordinance discriminated against interstate commerce because the ordinance "hoard[ed]
solid waste, and the demand to get rid of it, for the benefit of the preferred processing facility."' The Court held that the town could have

59. Id. at 1680.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1681.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1684.
66. Id. at 1681.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1681.
69. Id. at 1683. Justice O'Connor, concurring in the judgment, believed ClarkstDwn's ordinance
violated the dormant Commerce Clause not because it discriminated against interstate commerce, but because it imposed an excessive burden on interstate commerce. Id. at 1687 (O'Connor, J.. concurring). Noting that die ordinance did not give an economic preference to local interests, O'Connor found that all competitors, local and non-local, suffered as a result of the ordinance. Id. at 1688. For this reason, the law
discriminated evenhalndedly instead of against non-local competitors. Id.

Analyzing the State's interest, O'Connor stated that while the central px se behind die ordinance
was financial, to the exten the town's purpose was to address health and environmental concems, the town
could have used existing, less burdensome alternatives. Id. at 1690-91. Finally, Justice O'Connor considered
the Clarkstown ordinance's interaction with similar wastedisposal regimes existing in other jurisdictions and
the potential effect if other jurisdictions enacted legislation similar to ClarkAstown's. Id. She determined that if

other jurisdictions had similar laws, interstate commerce would be severely burdened. Id. The cost to dispose waste would escalate and processors would be in compliance with some waste-disposal laws and in
violation of other laws at the same time. Id.
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enacted nondiscriminatory uniform safety regulations.7' Such safety regulations would adequately serve the town's health and environmental problems. 7
Non-discriminatoryLaws
If the law at issue does not discriminate against interstate commerce,
a court will determine whether the law is invalid under the balancing test
of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. :'
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to
the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is
found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the
extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on
whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on
interstate activities."
The test for non-discriminatory regulations is less rigorous than the test
for discriminatory regulations. 74 But under certain circumstances, even a
nondiscriminatory regulation's burden on interstate commerce may be too
severe.75 In Pike, the State of Arizona required that all cantaloupes raised
in Arizona be packaged in Arizona.7' The regulation only indirectly affected the interstate transportation of cantaloupes.' To comply with the
regulation, the petitioner would have been required to build a $200,000
packaging plant in Arizona, instead of shipping the produce thirty-one
miles to its packaging plant in California.78

70. Id. at 1683.
71. Id.
72. 397 U.S. 137 (1970). The Pike case's "contribution to understanding of the Supreme
Court's recent Commerce Clause analysis cannot be understated. Indeed, the Pike case and the doctrines it embodies are probably the most influential forces in the Court's Commerce Clause analysis
today." Matthew C. Urie, Share and Share Alike? Natural Resources and Hazardous Waste Under
the Commerce Clause, 35 NAT. RESOURCES. J. 309, 348 (1995).
73. 397 U.S. at 142 (citation omitted).
74. The Supreme Court has stated that the balancing test is "much more flexible" than the
strict scrutiny test. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
75. Pike, 397 U.S. at 146; see supra note 69.
76. 397 U.S. at 138.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 139, 144.
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The Supreme Court noted the legitimacy of Arizona's interest in
protecting and enhancing the reputation of Arizona growers. 9 The Court,
however, distinguished the interest of Arizona's law from laws enacted in
the interest of safety or consumer protection.' Remarking that the result
might be different if a more compelling interest were involved, the Court
held that the financial hardship on the petitioner was clearly excessive in
relation to Arizona's interest in enhancing the reputation of Arizona cantaloupe producers."8

The three cases described above, Hughes v. Oklahoma, C & A
Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., and Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,
set forth the various methods of analysis that apply to challenges under
the dormant Commerce Clause. The theories underlying these cases illustrate the problems with Wyoming's license allocation system, and with
challenging the regulations under the dormant Commerce Clause.
The Clajon Litigation
In 1993, three landowner guides (plaintiffs) brought suit against the
Wyoming Game and Fish Commission, the Wyoming Game and Fish
Department and certain individual members of the Commission and Department in the Federal District Court for the District of Wyoming.' The
plaintiffs' arguments included constitutional challenges to Wyoming laws
regulating landowners, outfitters and guides.83 One of these claims alleged
that Wyoming's percentage allocation regulations violated the dormant
Commerce Clause." Claiming that the allocation system restricted their
opportunity to sell their hunting services to nonresidents, the plaintiffs
argued that the regulation facially discriminates against interstate commerce because it expressly allocates far fewer licenses to nonresidents.'

79. Id. at 143.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 146.

82. Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 854 F.Supp. 843 (D. Wyo. 1994).
83. The plaintiffs argued that WYO. STAT. ANN. § 23-1-103 (Michie 1977) violated the Takings Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 854 F.Supp. 843. Section
23-1-103, in pertinent part, states that "all wildlife in Wyoming is the property of the state." Id. In

addition, the plaintiffs challenged the landowner licenses regulation, WYO. REG. CH. XLIV, § 3. on
the grounds that the regulation violated the Equal Protection Clause and the Takings Clause. 854
F.Supp. 843. This regulation provides that qualified landowners, because of their ownership, may
receive two hunting licenses without having to enter a competitive drawing. WYO. REG. Ci. XLIV,

§ 3 (1996).
84. 854 F.Supp. at 849. The plaintiffs' land includes areas designated as limited quota areas by

the Wyoming Game and Fish Department for hunting purposes. Id. Therefore, the number of licenses
allocated for those limited quota areas favors resident over nonresident hunters.
85. Id.
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The district court'a held that the regulations did not discriminate
against interstate commerce.' The court concluded that "Itihe regulations
simply do not, on their face or in effect, establish any barriers to the
plaintiffs' ability to sell their services and the corollary goods

. . .

to non-

residents."" In support, the court noted that the plaintiffs did not offer
evidence required to substantiate their dormant Commerce Clause discrimination claim.' Additionally, the court ruled that the plaintiffs erroneously equated residency discrimination with discrimination against commerce because there was no "nexus" between the regulations and commerce.' Finally, the court opined that Wyoming plaintiffs should challenge Wyoming's regulations legislatively rather than judicially. 9
The court noted that the plaintiffs did not argue or present evidence
that the regulations excessively burdened interstate commerce.9 For this
reason, the court could not analyze the regulations under the Pike v.
Bruce Church balancing test,' and decided that it would be impossible to
conduct a meaningful discussion of whether less burdensome alternatives
exist. 94
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
dismissed the plaintiffs' dormant Commerce Clause claim." The court
held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue under the dormant Commerce Clause because they did not "establish[] that the regulations interfere[d] with their ability to-provide commercial hunting services to out-ofstate residents. "' While the plaintiffs established that "nonresidents spend
more than residents for the use of hunting services," they did not show
that the regulations cause fewer nonresidents to hunt in Wyoming.'
86. Judge Brimmer presiding. Id. at 846.
87. Id. at 860.
88. Id.
89. The plaintiffs' alleged that the regulations decreased their ability to sell their services to
nonresidents. Id. at 860. The court stated that a necessary premise to this argument included a showing that nonresidents are more likely to purchase the plaintiffs' services than resident hunters, but
found that the plaintiffs did not support the premise with evidence. Id. A future plaintiff can show
that nonresidents are more likely to purchase outfitting services than are residents. See supra note 13
and accompanying text.
90. Id. at860-61.
91. Id. at 861.
92. Id. at 861-62, 862 n.34.
93. See supra text accompanying note 73.
94. 854 F.Supp. at 862.
95. Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera. 70 F.3d 1566, 1569 (10th Cir. 1995).
96. Id. at 1571.
97. Id. at 1573. The court stated that the injury suffered by the plaintiff must be "fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct." Id. (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 757
(1984)). The "Plaintiffs must demonstrate that (the regulations] disproportionately disadvantage[]
nonresidents by failing adequately to approximate the ratio of demand between in-state and out-of-
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With respect to the dormant Commerce Clause claim, the Clajon
litigation has no preclusive effect on any future plaintiff. The issue of
whether the regulations violated the dormant Commerce Clause because
they imposed a clearly excessive burden on interstate commerce was not
raised by the Clajon plaintiffs,' and, therefore, was not decided by the
district court or the court of appeals. The district court decided the claim
that the regulations discriminated against commerce." However, because
the court of appeals dismissed the claim for lack of Article III justiciability," a future plaintiff may again challenge the regulations on the ground
that the regulations discriminate against interstate commerce.
The only barrier to a dormant Commerce Clause claim created by
the Clajon litigation may be one of standing. The court of appeals, however, outlined the evidence a future plaintiff will need to proffer in order
to establish standing.' The court recognized that outfitters are injured-infact because Wyoming's system limits opportunity for an economic benefit."' 2 In addition, the court stated that the outfitter's injury would be
fairly traceable to Wyoming's system if nonresident license demand is
greater than the number of licenses allocated to nonresidents."0 The injury to outfitters, however, is also fairly traceable to the regulations because
of the burden on the outfitter's commerce caused by the uncertainty of the
system."'° For these reasons, an outfitter can demonstrate standing to
challenge the licening allocation system.
DISCUSSION

PreliminaryDormant Commerce Clause Obstacles
The first hurdle that any new plaintiff must clear is to show that the
dormant Commerce Clause applies to these license regulations." Second, if
a plaintiff is a Wyoming outfitter, the outfitter must show that a Wyoming
state hunters." Id. The court further noted that some of the plaintiffs' affidavits offered conclusory
allegations that the regulations deter some nonresidents from entering Wyoming to hunt. Id. at 157374. However, this was not sufficient, because the court felt that some applicants will be deterred from
applying when demand outstrips supply, regardless of a hunter's residency. Id.
98. 854 F.Supp. at 861-62.
99. 854 F.Supp. at 860,
100. 70 F.3d at 1572. The court stated that "[t]he requirement that a litigant have 'standing' to
invoke the power of a federal court is perhaps the most important of the Article IMI
justiciability doctrines." Id. (citing Allen v. Wright. 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)),
101. Id. at 1572-74.
102. Id. at 1573.
103. Id.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 14-22.
105. Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 854 F.Supp. 843, 860 (1994).
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resident can challenge regulations enacted by Wyoming under the dormant
Commerce Clause."° Both of these obstacles are easily overcome.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Baldwin v. Montana0 7 held that Montana
could prefer its residents to nonresidents in requiring nonresidents to pay
substantially higher big game license fees."'8 This holding might appear to
doom any attack on Wyoming's existing license allocation scheme by Wyoming outfitters. Baldwin, however, does not govern a dormant Commerce
Clause challenge to Wyoming's license allocation system. Badwin involved a
Privileges and Immunities challenge" and an Equal Protection challenge,"10
not a dormant Commerce Clause challenge."' The Court held that hunting
was a recreational sport, and thus not the type of activity the Privileges and
Immunities Clause protected."' The Court also held that the license fees were
rationally related to Montana's goals under the Equal Protection Clause."'
Because the Ba/dwin Court addressed neither outfitting services nor the dormant Commerce Clause, both issues remain to be decided." 4
The Clajon district court remarked that the dormant Commerce
Clause "requires a nexus to commerce before it applies.""' Although

106. Id. at 861.
107. 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
108. Id. at 388. See infra text accompanying notes 112-24.
109. The U.S. Constitution provides: "Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges
and Immunities of Citizens in the several states." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
110. U.S. CONSr. amend. XIV, § 1.
111. 436 U.S. 371. While Baldwin did not involve a dormant Commerce Clause challenge, such
a challenge was brought against Colorado's hunting allocation preference. Terk v. Ruch, 655 F.Supp.
205 (D. Colo. 1987). The Federal District Court for the District of Colorado addressed a license
preference law that allocated ninety percent of mountain goat and bighom sheep hunting permits to
residents. Id. The plaintiff was a nonresident, recreational hunter. The plaintiff claimed, in part, that
the law violated the dormant Commerce Clause, under Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
Terk, 655 F.Supp. at 215. The Terk court distinguished Hughes, noting that in Hughes, minnows
were the article of commerce, whereas Colorado made it illegal to sell mountain goat and bighorn
sheep. Id. The court further remarked that the "commercial livelihood" at stake in Hughes was not a
concern of the plaintiff because the plaintiff was merely a recreational hunter. Id. Had the plaintiff
been an outfitter, the court may have addressed the question of whether outfitting constitutes a commercial livelihood.
112. 436 U.S. at 388. Because the Privileges and Immunities Clause protects only fundamental
rights, the dormant Commerce Clause protects at times when the Privileges and Immunities Clause
would not. Jenna Bednar & William Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court's "Unsteady Path':A Theory
of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447, 1488 (1995).
113. 436 U.S. at 391.
114. State regulation of wildlife is subject to the same Commerce Clause standards as any other
type of state regulation if the regulation affects interstate commerce. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 335.
Bakdwin also recognized that a state may not "hoard" wildlife if the state impedes interstate commerce. Baldwin, 436 U.S. 385-86. The Supreme Court has also held that the Lacey Act
Amendments do not direct federal courts to treat state wildlife laws more leniently, with respect to
Commerce Clause scrutiny. Maine, 477 U.S. 138-40. See supra note 40.
115. 854 F. Supp. at 860.
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Wyoming's license allocation regulations do not govern outfitter services,
U.S. Supreme Court precedent shows that the dormant Commerce Clause
protects commerce in a secondary market such as outfitting services." 'in
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, the State's statute prohibited the
import of garbage that came from beyond New Jersey's border." 7 The
plaintiffs, among whom were New Jersey operators of private landfills,
successfully argued that New Jersey's law affected not only those doing
business in transporting garbage, but also those providing services (landfill disposal) to those transporting garbage."' In other words, the commerce burdened by the statute, the sale of landfill space, -was different
from the commerce regulated by the statute, the interstate shipment of
waste. The Supreme Court held that the law violated the dormant Commerce Clause even though the negative effects were felt in a secondary
market." 9 The Court made clear that if the law discriminates against or
excessively burdens interstate commerce, the dormant Commerce Clause
will protect interstate commerce, regardless of whether that commerce is
directly or secondarily related to the law.'20 Thus, even if outfitters' commerce is secondarily related to Wyoming's allocation system, the dormant
Commerce Clause will protect their commerce.
Arguably, Wyoming's political process should suffice to protect
residents from the sort of alleged discrimination at work in the license
allocation scheme.' Wyoming outfitters can indeed complain to their
elected representatives about the impact of the scheme. But the Supreme Court has clearly indicated that the residency of the plaintiff is
not dispositive, as the protection of the dormant Commerce Clause
reaches residents as well as nonresidents. 22 The dormant Commerce
Clause equally protects nonresident interests and Wyoming outfitters
from a Wyoming regulation that discriminates against or excessively
burdens interstate commerce.' 23

116. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
117. Id. at 618-19.
118. Id. at 619.
119. Id. at 629.
120. Id.
121. The Clajon district court indicated that tie plaintiffs' more appropriate avenue of redress
was the political process. Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 854 F. Supp. 843, 861 (D. Wyo. 1994).
122. See. e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey. 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (New Jersey residents
challenging a New Jersey law). See also Clajon, 70 F.3d 1566, 1571 n.II (10th Cir. 1995) (noting
that the '[d]efendants are mistaken that the Commerce Clause protects only nonresidents from state

regulations that excessively burden commerce. In-state residents may also assert a Commerce Clause
challenge.").
123. 70 F.3d 1566. 1571 n.l1.
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Wyoming's License Allocation System Probably Does Not Discriminate
Against Interstate Commerce
The Wyoming license allocation system gives more licenses to resident hunters than to nonresidents. However, the language of the regulations does not facially discriminate in an economic manner, nor does it
overtly regulate commerce.' Unlike the discriminatory law in Hughes, 5
the Wyoming license allocation regulations do not explictly address the
article of commerce-outfitting services-that is allegedly burdened."as
Unlike a regulation that distinguishes between resident outfitters and
nonresident outfitters (or their services), Wyoming's regulations do not

facially discriminate against interstate commerce.127

Although the regulations directly determine only the question of who
has hunting access to wildlife, the regulations do have interstate economic
effects." Wyoming's license allocation system limits the numbers of non124. Clajon, 854 F.Supp. at 860.
125. See supra note 51.
126. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
127. An example of a facially discriminatory law is Wyoming's ban on the import of wildlife.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 23-3-301(a) (Michie 1977). This statute was challenged under the dormant Commerce Clause and found to facially discriminate against interstate commerce. Dorrance v. McCarthy,
957 F.2d 761 (10th Cir. 1992). The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's order granting
Wyoming's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 761. The Tenth Circuit held that the ban on the
private ownership of big game does not discriminate against interstate commerce. Id. at 763. Because
it operates evenhandedly, die court determined that the Pike balancing test applied to the ownership
ban. Id. The court did not determine the validity of the private ownership ban under the Pike test, but
found that summary judgment was inappropriate because the district court failed to consider evidence
of the burden on interstate commerce and the existence of alternatives. Id. at 763. 765. Noting the
existence of an extensive interstate market in big game animals, the Tenth Circuit held that
Wyoming's ban on the import of big game animals "discriminates against interstate commerce on its
face" because the import ban prevented the plaintiff from importing big game animals. Id. at 765.
But see Pacific Northwest Venison Producers v. Smitch. 20 F.3d 1008. 1012 (9th Cir.
1994). In Pacific, the court "respectfully disagree[d]* with the Dorrance decision and found that an
import ban on certain animal species was not discriminatory per se. The court remarked that the
practical effect of the import ban:
adds nothing to the prohibitions that apply equally to in-state and out-of-state interests,
because animals could not be imported if they are not allowed to be [possessed or sold]
once inside the State. An import ban that simply effectuates a complete ban on commerce
in certain items is not discriminatory, as long as the ban on commerce does not make
distinctions based on the origin of the items.
Id.
128. See, e.g.. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y.. 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1681
(1994) (concluding that, although the immediate effect of Clarkstown's ordinance only directed the
local transport of waste to a designated facility within the local jurisdiction, the economic effects of
the ordinance were interstate in reach). In Clajon, the district court held, without elaborating, that
Wyoming's regulations did not discriminate in-effect. 854 F.Supp. at 860. After discussing facial
discrimination, the court remarked only that the "regulation is not a facially discriminatory enact[Even if) these regulations place an incidental burden on commerce, they do not discrimiment ....
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residents who may take wildlife. This limitation impacts the outfitting
industry because the system creates a barrier between outfitters and the
market beyond Wyoming's borders."n The overall effect of the regulations on both local and interstate activity is critical to the analysis of
whether Wyoming's regulations discriminate in effect. 130
Wyoming's regulations hoard wildlife for the benefit of a preferred
group. In this sense, the regulations are similar in purpose and effect to
the ordinance held unconstitutional in C & A Carbone.131 However, the
ordinance in C & A Carbone regulated the processing of waste, the very
commercial activity in which C & A Carbone sought to engage.' With
respect to Wyoming's regulations, providing outfitting services is a commercial activity not regulated by the license allocation scheme. Moreover,
the preferred group, resident hunters, does not gain any sort of economic
advantage over outfitters.
Outfitters must demonstrate that a local group receives an economic
advantage. If the regulations confer an economic benefit to Wyoming
interests and place an economic burden on out-of-state interests, a court
may find that Wyoming's license allocation system discriminates "in
effect" against interstate commerce. 3 For example, local outfitters who
cater exclusively or primarily to Wyoming hunters would benefit from the
eighty and eighty-four percent allocation, while outfitters who cater to
nonresidents would be discriminated against by the corresponding twenty
and sixteen percent allocation." If this were the case, Wyoming's statute

nate against commerce. The regulations simply do not, on their face or in effect, establish any barriers to the plaintiffs' ability to sell their services.., to nonresidents." Id.
129. The Clajon district court remarked that the regulations may indirectly place an incidental
burden on commerce, and that "[tiaken to its extreme, it is hard to imagine any regulation that does
not, to some extent, affect commerce." 854 F.Supp. at 860 n.33 (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111 (1942)). See also supra text accompanying note 88.
130. See, Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579
(1986). In Brown-Forman Distillers Corporation, New York's liquor law required that a distiller's
prices for liquor sold in New York not be higher than the lowest prices the distiller charged anywhere
else in the United States. Id. at 576. While New York's law only addressed sales of liquor in New
York, the law's practical effect essentially attempted to control liquor prices in other states. Id. at
583. The Court held that this effect violated the dormant Commerce Clause. Id. at 585.
131. 114 S. Ct. 1677. See supra text accompanying note 69.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 61-64.
133. Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Oregon, 114 S. Ct. 1345, 1350 (1994).
134. Because some outfitters are able to sell a portion of their services to nonresidents, not
all interstate commerce ceases as a result of the regulations. However, the dormant Commerce
Clause cases have established that it is not required that the interstate commerce at issue completely cease. C & A Carbone, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1681 (transporting waste was not prohibited
under the ordinance as long as the petitioner paid the tipping-fee to the favored transfer station);
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) (conferring only a preference to residents
rather than sole access to the article of commerce may still violate the dormant Commerce
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would be similar to Clarkstown's ordinance in C & A Carbone in that the
enacting jurisdiction confers an economic benefit on a local group and
places a burden on other groups who engage in interstate business. 35 The
regulations would impact outfitters differently based upon whether their
commerce with clients crossed state lines.' 36 Unlike the Clarkstown ordinance that Justice O'Connor found equally burdensome on both in-town
waste processors and out-of-town waste processors,", Wyoming's regulations would not operate evenhandedly.
Wyoming prefers to protect its resources for the benefit of its citizens. Wyoming's license allocation system may be protectionist, but the
type of protectionism differs from that found to violate the dormant Commerce Clause because Wyoming's system is not founded upon economic
protectionism.3 8 Wyoming's system does more to promote a political
preference for Wyoming hunters than it does to protect Wyoming's economy. Unless there were evidence that the Wyoming Game and Fish Commission enacted the regulations with an intent to protect Wyoming's
economy, the regulations would not likely trigger the heightened scrutiny
analysis. 39
Wyoming's License Allocation System May Impose A "Clearly Excessive
Burden" On Interstate Commerce
A regulation may violate the dormant Commerce Clause if the
regulation's burden on interstate commerce is clearly excessive in relation
Clause). See also, Chambers Medical Tech. of S.C. v. Bryant, 52 F.3d 1252, 1264 (4th Cir.
1995) (requiring that infectious waste could not be kept at ambient temperature for more than
twenty-four hours while being transported, the State's regulations burdened interstate commerce
even though some interstate destinations could be reached within twenty-four hours).
135. See supra text accompanying notes 66-67.
136. The situational needs of the hunters who purchase outfitting services mean that outfitting
clients are more likely to be nonresidents than residents. Sheaffer Interview, (Mar. 12, 1996). This
probably means that there are not a large number of outfitters who cater exclusively or predominately
to residents. Id. While these outfitters would benefit from the regulations, their nonexistence may
indicate that the regulations confer no benefit to a local group at the expense of interstate commerce.
137. See supra note 69.
138. In City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey, the Court discussed the relationship between protectionism and the Commerce Clause, and the kind of protectionism on which the Court concentrates:
"The opinions of the Court through the years have reflected an alertness to the evils of 'economic
isolation' and protectionism .... [Where simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected." 437 U.S. 617, 623-24.
139. Id. See, e.g., Maine Y. Taylor, where Maine's Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife
justified its regulation on the grounds that Maine's import-ban regulation injected money into
Maine's economy, and that the regulation might facilitate the growth of lucrative export industries.
The Court decided that this language was insufficient to convert the statute into an economic protectionist law because the statements were made long after the law was enacted and thus did not show
economic protectionist intent. 477 U.S. 131, 149-50.
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to the putative state interest.140 Outfitting is almost always an interstate
business.14 1 While an extensive interstate market lies just beyond
Wyoming's border, 42 Wyoming's regulations appear to erect a barrier by
withholding at least eighty percent of limited quota big game licenses
from nonresidents. 43 In addition, the licenses that are allocated to nonresidents are distributed with such uncertainty that the regulations burden
interstate commerce. The burdens that these two features of the license
allocation system impose on outfitters can be illustrated by a hypothetical
outfitter.
"A", a Wyoming resident outfitter, provides outfitting services for
hunts in Wyoming. "A" leases exclusive elk hunting rights on private
land designated by the Game and Fish Department as a limited quota
area. "A" attends an outfitting convention and meets potential nonresident
clients. Ten potential clients agree to come to Wyoming to hunt with
"A". Each submits a completed application to the Wyoming Game & Fish
Department to hunt on the limited quota area.
Wyoming's licensing scheme automatically denies nonresident
access to eighty-four percent of the elk licenses available on "A's"
leased land.' "A's" ten potential nonresident clients have access to
sixteen percent of the licenses available on "A's" leased land. If, for
example, a total of ten elk licenses are available on "A's" leased
property, less than two licenses will be available to nonresident hunt-

140. See supra text accompanying note 73.
141. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
142. This market is similar to the extensive interstate market in big game animals recognized by
the Dorrance court. See supra note 127. The August-October 1996 edition of BUGLE magazine illus-

trates the extent of the interstate market in outfitting services, in which outfitters located in fourteen
states represent hunting in all fifty states and many foreign nations. Oulfters Camp, BUGLE, Aug.Oct. 1996, at 177-93. This magazine also contains separate sections for booking agents, who match
hunters and outfiters, and state outfitter associations. Id. Outfitter conventions also illustrate the
interstate market. At these conventions, outfitting services and information about outfitters are exchanged. The North American Hunting Expo sends information about its convention to outfitters and
invites them to rent booths to market outfitting services. The information states: "We are uniting
thousand [sic] of hunters and have booked only a handful of outfitters so far. If I was an outfitter
looking to sell out, this is where I would want to be." Letter From Thomas Erikson, CEO, North

American Hunting Expo, Inc (on file with author).
143. See, e.g., Dorrance, 957 F.2d at 764 (finding that "the extensive interstate market in big
game animals ... was shut out of Wyoming because of the ban"). In all probablility, future plaintiffs
will need to show that the percentages allocated by Wyoming do not adequately reflect nonresident
demand for elk and other big game hunting licenses. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. The
eighty percent allocation only creates a barrier if nonresident demand exceeds the number of licenses

allocated to nonresidents. Statistics showing resident and nonresident demand and success rates by
hunting area are available from the Wyoming Game and Fish Department.

144. Similarly, in C & A Carbone, one of the problems with Clarkstown's ordinance was that it
denied nonresidents access to Clarkstown's market. C & A Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1681.
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ers. Statistically, only one of "A's" potential clients will be able to
draw a license. Against "A's" other potential clients, each potential
client will have a ten percent chance of drawing the single license.
Were these ten applicants the only nonresidents applying for this area,
one would draw. However, Wyoming's system allows nonresident
hunters to apply for any nonresident area. If even one nonresident elk
hunter, who did not contract with "A", applied for this area, the odds
of "A's" potential clients drawing a license become even more remote
and uncertain." 5 Quite probably, none of A's clients draws a license.
Thus, denying access to "A's" potential nonresident clients prohibits
"A" from providing services across state lines.
The burdens Wyoming's percentage allocation system imposes on
outfitters essentially require outfitters to carry out Wyoming's preference
and sell their services to Wyoming residents." 4 If "A" wants access to the
remaining eighty-four percent of the available licenses, "A" will have to
provide outfitting services to residents. This would not be problematic,
but for the lack of resident demand for outfitter services. 47 The lack of
demand results in lower income and a lost opportunity for a profitable
market.' The regulations may force "A" out of business because money
derived from resident clients is insufficient to operate "A's" outfitting
business and "A's" nonresident clients cannot draw licenses. 49 If the
regulations force "A" out of business, the burdens on interstate commerce
would be severe. The extent of the burden on outfitters may surpass that
found to be excessively burdensome in Pike."o

145. Wyoming's license allocation system imposes a further burden on outfitters because
Wyoming's system discourages potential clients who do not draw licenses from applying to hunt in
Wyoming in future years because the outfitter cannot express any certainty to prospective clients that
they will draw a license. Telephone Interview with Steve Sheaffer, (Sept. 24, 1996). Supra note 11,
for qualifications.
146. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970).
147. See supra note 11.
148. Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1573 (10th Cir. 1995).
149. Since 1992, the number of licensed big game outfitters in Wyoming has annually declined.
Personal Communication. Wyoming State Board of Outfitters & Professional Guides, (Oct. 1, 1996).
During the last five years, there has been an 8.8 percent reduction in the number of big game outfitters. Id. The Board of Outfitters and Professional Guides does not retain information that explains the
reasons for increases or decreases in the number of outfitters. Telephone interview with Jane Flagg,
Administrator, Wyoming State Board of Outfitters & Professional Guides, Cheyenne, Wyo. (Oct. 14,
1996).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 78-81.
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Wyoming's Interest
The state interest must be balanced against the burdens on interstate
commerce.' 5' The declared purpose of Wyoming's license allocation
system is to maintain a lasting wildlife resource. 5 2 This purpose is legitimate. 53 The regulations, however, do not closely serve this purpose, as a
license allocation system preferring residents does not better protect wildlife than a nonpreferential license allocation system. I5 Because of their
greater familiarity with hunting areas and their more regular access to
Wyoming wildlife and habitat, Wyoming residents are in a better position
to take more animals than nonresidents. In actuality, the current percentage allocation system serves Wyoming's interest in conserving wildlife
less effectively than an allocation that would give more licenses to nonresidents because of nonresidents' lower hunting success rate.',,
A more plausible explanation might be that the Game and Fish
Commission desires to confer a non-economic reward on Wyoming
residents."' s In times of shortage, states may give residents a limited

151. See supra text accompanying note 73.
152. "It is the purpose of this act and the policy of the state to provide an adequate and flexible
system for control, propagation, management, protection and regulation of all Wyoming wildlife."
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 23-1-103 (Michie 1977). Similarly, in Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 854
F.Supp. 843 (D. Wyo. 1994), Wyoming argued that the "purpose of ... [the] regulation [is] to
protect the state's production and supply of game." Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, at 13, Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 854 F. Supp. 843 (D. Wyo. 1994) (No. 93 CV 223B) (on
file with the Land and Water Law Review).
153. The Supreme Court has noted that this interest is similar to a state's interest in protecting
the health and welfare of its citizens. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979); Maine v.
Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986).
154. Other Wyoming game laws illustrate a more direct connection to Wyoming's conservation
purpose. For example, Wyoming's ban on the import of wildlife into Wyoming from any source
arguably protects the integrity of native species from disease and ensures genetic purity. WYO STAT.
ANN. § 23-3-301 (Michie 1977). See also, Dorrance v. McCarthy, 957 F.2d 761 (10th Cir. 1992). In
Dorrance, Wyoming argued that the import ban on the private ownership of big game animals advanced Wyoming's purposes to "preserve a free-ranging wildlife resource, to prevent the spread of
disease and genetic alteration, and to facilitate enforcement of game laws." Id. at 763. The District
Court for the District of Wyoming held that these purposes were legitimate. Id.
155. An illustration of a law that does nothing toward achieving the purposes for which it was enacted
is Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977). The declared purpose of North
Carolina's statut was to protect consumers from deception and fraud in the marketplace. Id. at 353. The
Supreme Court recognized the unquestioned validity of that goal, but found that the statute did 'remarkably
little to further that laudable goal." Id. at 353. The Court held that the smatte actually magnified the problems of deception and confitsion by depriving consumers of all information conceming the quality of the
contents of closed apple containers. Id. The Court also held that although the statute was a consumer protection measure, it did "nothing at all to purify the flow of information at the retail level, [and thus did] little to
protect consumers against the problems it was designed to eliminate." Id. See supra note 56.
156. The Clajon district court implied that the regulations merely attempt to reward residents.
noting that "[t]he plaintiffs' claim erroneously equates residency discrimination with discrimination
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preference to a natural resource." However, for the purposes of dormant
Commerce Clause analysis, Wyoming's interest in conferring a reward on
the basis of residency might not carry as much weight as would
Wyoming's interest in protecting wildlife. ' Notwithstanding the less rigorous scrutiny under the balancing test,' 59 a court might not defer to
Wyoming's purpose of rewarding residents if outfitters could show that
the regulations cause them to go out of business.
Alternatives to Wyoming's License Allocation System
Many alternatives to Wyoming's license allocation system exist.
From January to July 1996, the License Allocation Task Force discussed
alternative systems of license allocation, but could not reach a consensus
on any proposed alternative system.' 6' This failure is another indication of
the controversial nature of license allocation in Wyoming, but does not
determine that alternative systems would burden interstate commerce to a
lesser degree and adequately serve Wyoming's interests. 62

against commerce." Clajon 854 F.Supp. at 860.
In addition, Wyoming, in its interrogatory answers, admitted that the "unequal allocation of
licenses which favors residents helps maintain resident support for continued sacrifice and the maintenance of big game populations." Defendants' Answers to Plaintiffs' First Interrogatoriesand Requests
for Production of Documents, Answer to Interrogatory 12, Clajon Prod. Co. v. Petera, 853 F. Supp.
(D. Wyo. 1994) (No. 93 CV 223B) (on file with the Land and Water Law Review).
157. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982). In Sporhase, theCourt noted that the importance a
state may place in preserving its water resources may justify a limited preference to its citizens. Id. at 95657. But see Oregon Waste Systems v. Oregon, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 1354 (1994). The Court in Oregon Waste
Systems rejected Oregon's claim that it was merely protecting its resources rather than its economy. Id. In its
discussion of Spoti'hse and resource protectionism, theOregon Court stated that "[h]owever serious the
shortage in landfill space may be... '[nlo State may attempt to isolate itself from a problem common to
the several States by raising barriers to thefree flow of interstate trade.'" Id. (quoting Chemical Waste
Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 339-40 (1992)). The Oregon Court noted that water was unlike
other natural resources. Id. (citing Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 952). These two cases appear to show that,
while
the dormant Commerce Clause applies to laws regulating natural resources, the parameters of the exception
enuciated in Sporhase appear narrow, albeit somewhat undefined.
158. "[Sltates may not compel the confinement of the benefits of their resources, even their wildlife,
to their own people whenever such hoarding and confinement impedes interstate commerce." Baldwin v.
Montana, 436 U.S. 371,385-86 (1978). See also, Thomas K. Anson and P.M. Schenkkan, Federalism,the
Dormant Commerce COause and State-Owned Resources. 59 TEX. L. REV. 71, 96-97 (1980) (arguing that
"when a stat's unique access to [fictionally state-owned] resources is a matter of mere happenstance, its
decision to discriminate does not involve redistribution of wealth generated by the collective foresight, risk
and industry of its citizens.").
159. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
160. In Pike, the Court distinguished other cases where the state interest was to prevent fraudulent practices in the marketplace or promote safe produce and Arizona's interest in enhancing the
reputation of Arizona's cantaloupe growers. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 143 (1970),
see supra note 79 and accompanying text.
161. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 30, at 6-15.
162. Alternatives are also important when a law discriminates against interstate commerce. If
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Some Wyoming organizations have proposed variations of a set-aside
license.'6 Set-aside systems would provide licensed outfitters preferential
or exclusive access to a pool of licenses. The burden on interstate commerce would be less because the set-aside would provide certainty to the
outfitter that at least some percentage of its clients would predictably
receive licenses. A set-aside system would serve Wyoming's interest in
protecting wildlife as well as the current system.
A set-aside system might also serve Wyoming's interest in maintaining resident support for Wyoming's hunting program. Although resident
hunters would not be supportive of Wyoming's hunting program if they
perceived a reduction in the number of licenses allocated to them under
the current system," a set-aside system does not have to detrimentally
affect resident hunters. First, if the set-aside licenses came from those
currently allocated to nonresidents, the number of licenses allocated to

the plaintiff demonstrates that the law is discriminatory, the enacting jurisdiction must show that its
interest underlying the law cannot be served by less-discriminatory alternatives. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56. 70-71.
The Clajon district court determined that it could not inquire into whether less burdensome
alternatives exist because the condition precedent-a showing of the nature and extent of the bur-

den-was not presented. Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Peera, 854 F.Supp. 843, 862 (D. Wyo. 1994). But
see, Pacific Northwest Venison Producers v. Smitch, 20 F.3d 1008, 1015-17 (9th Cir. 1994). In
PacoiicNorthwest Venison Producers,the court chose to analyze the plaintiffs' proposed alternatives
irrespective of the fact that the burden on interstate commerce was not clearly shown. Id. at 1016.
The court stated:
While the lack of evidence as to what the extent of the burden is makes the determination
of "the extent of the burden that will be tolerated" problematic, we proceed on the assumption that overwhelming evidence that the regulations are unnecessary could add

enough force to the mere existence of burdens on interstate commerce to overcome the
presumption that the regulations are valid.
Id.
163. Three variants of a set-aside system have been proposed by outfitting organizations. First,
the Professional Recreation Outfitters proposed that thirty-five percent of the total available nonresident big game licenses be placed in an "Outfitter Only Drawing." PROFESSIONAL RECREATION OUTFITTERS OF WYOMING, CHALLENGE F, PART 1, at 8, (June 1995). In the "Outfitter Only Drawing,"
these licenses would only be available to nonresident hunters who intend to hunt with an outfitter.
Second, the Commercial Recreation Coalition proposed that the total number of available licenses be
divided into three groups: resident, commercial, and nonresident. The allocation to each group would
vary "according to outfitter capacity, resident hunters, and number of licenses available in each area,
among other factors." COMMERCIAL RECREATION COALrrmON PROPOSAL, at 2-3, (June 23, 1995).
The commercial group licenses would be available to hunters who have an outfitting contract with a
licensed outfitter or landowner licensed as an outfitter. Id. Finally, the Wyoming Outfitters and
Guides Association proposed an "Outfitter / Landowner License Pool," under which thirty percent of
elk licenses and forty percent of deer licenses from the total number available would be set-aside for
outfitter and landowner use. WYOMING OUTFITrERS AND GUIDES ASSOCIATION, REPORT TO THE
BOARD OF DIRECrORS, LICENSE ALLOCATION PROPOSALS, (June 18, 1995) (on file with the Land and
Water Law Review).
164. Jason Marsden, Anti-Outfter Grassroots Effort Threatened, CASPER STAR. TRtB., Aug.
28, 1996, at Al.
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residents would remain unchanged. Second, if some set-aside licenses
came from those currently allocated to residents, a system under which
the set-aside licenses would be available to resident clients as well as
nonresident clients would still allow resident hunters access to the licenses. Moreover, if any of the set-aside licenses came from those currently
alloted to nonresidents, residents would have access to a greater number
of licenses than they do currently. In any event, a court considering this
alternative could look at set-aside systems operating in states surrounding
Wyoming to determine a set-aside allocation's burden on interstate commerce and whether a set-aside system would meet Wyoming's interest. 16
A second alternative is a "market-driven license."1" Under this
system, a small number of licenses from the total number available would
be set-aside, but unlike other set-asides, no particular hunting interest
would have preferential access to the licenses. 67 The price of a license
would be adjusted each year to account for increased or decreased demand.' The goals of the system are to approximate the market value of
big game licenses, increase revenue to the Game and Fish Department,'
and gain more public hunting access. 7 ° A market-driven system would
not discriminate against interstate commerce. This system would reduce
burdens on interstate commerce because nonresidents who wish to hunt
with an outfitter but do not draw a limited quota license would still have
an opportunity to purchase a market-driven license.'' Again, this alternative would adequately serve Wyoming's interest in protecting wildlife but
not its interest in maintaining resident support if these licenses were taken
from those currently allocated to resident hunters.'72
Private ownership of big game animals is a third alternative to
Wyoming's license allocation system.' 3 Private ownership would allow

165. See Appendix, State Licensing Systems.

166. The Task Force considered a market-driven license allocation system, but could not recommended it to the Commission because one Task Force member, Dick Sadler, could not endorse it.
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 30, at 12-13, app. IX. The Game and Fish Commission is taking
public comment on a raffle and a competitive bid or auction system. Dan Neal, G&F Looks At Paying

For Private Access, CASPER STAR TRim., Oct. 30, 1996, at Al.
167. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 30, at 12-13.

168. Id.
169. Dan Neal, G&F Wants To Explore 'Market-Driven" Licenses, CASPER STAR TRIB., Aug.
27, 1996, at Al.
170. Revenues from this license could be used to purchase or lam additional public hinting lands. Id.

171. One variation on the market-driven system operates like an auction, where the highest
bidder receives the license. The State of Oregon has adopted such a license auction system. See Appendix, State Licensing Systems.
172. Dick Sadler, Stakes Went Up In Rich-Hunt-First. CASPER STAR TRI.. Aug. 28, 1996, atA9.
173. Currently WYO. STAT. ANN. § 23-1-103 (Michie 1977) prohibits the private ownership of
big game animals. The dormant Commerce Clause issue has been addressed in Dorrwce, where the
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individuals to raise and harvest domesticated big game animals on game
farms. These game farms could operate and be regulated much like gamebird farms. 174 Game farms would create separate sources of elk, deer and

other animals, thereby decreasing the competition for the limited number
of wild big game animals.
Nonresident hunters would be assured the opportunity to hunt, and
consequently outfitters could sell their services to any number of hunters
they chose. Compared to Wyoming's current license allocation system,
game farms would burden interstate commerce to a lesser degree, if at
all. Wyoming probably would argue that private ownership of big game
animals would threaten native big game animals.' If scientific uncertainty exists as to the risks to native big game species, a court might show
considerable deference to Wyoming's chosen method of regulation. 76 On
the other hand, disease testing procedures, random game farm inspection,
and import inspection are not "abstract" procedures" and would meet
Wyoming's conservation and protection interests."'
Given the many alternatives enacted by other states,"m challengers to
the current regulations probably can show that less burdensome means
could achieve Wyoming's goals. The burdens on interstate commerce are
likely to be clearly excessive in relation to Wyoming's purpose, if
Wyoming's purpose is to confer a non-economic benefit on resident
hunters. On the other hand, if a court determines that Wyoming's purpose
is to conserve and protect wildlife, as Wyoming alleges, it might be more
difficult to persuade a court that the burdens on interstate commerce are
"clearly excessive" in relation to Wyoming's interest.
Resolution by the Legislature
The Clajon litigation did not answer the question of whether
Wyoming's license allocation system discriminates against or places excessive burdens upon interstate commerce. 'a Future litigation to determine the constitutionality of Wyoming's system would also fail to resolve
Tenth Circuit has held that this ban on private ownership operates evenhandedly. Dorrance v. McCarthy, 957 F.2d 761, 763 (10th Cir. 1992). See supra note 127.
174. WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-5-101-201 (Michie 1977 & Supp. 1996).
175. See supra note 154.
176. See Maine v. Taylor, where the Court held that Maine had "a legitimate interest in guarding against imperfectly understood environmental risks, despite the possibility that they may ultimately prove to be negligible." 477 U.S. 131, 148.
177. Id. at 147.
178. See Dorrance, 957 F.2d at 764.
179. See Appendix, State Licensing Systems.
180. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
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the licensing controversy, regardless of the outcome. If outfitters prevailed, the court's decision would force Wyoming to change its system
but would not dictate the details of a lawful system. If unsuccessful,
outfitters would remain dissatisfied with Wyoming's current system and
would continue to lobby for legislative changes."'
In response to the on-going controversy, the Wyoming Legislature
should confront the problems with the current licensing system and consider the constitutional validity of alternative approaches under the dormant Commerce Clause. First, the legislature must avoid creating a system that discriminates against interstate commerce, triggering a heightened scrutiny analysis by the courts.' 82 As long as Wyoming does not
favor a local economic interest, this should be an easy task. Second, the
legislature must be mindful of the extent of the burdens imposed on interstate commerce balanced against Wyoming's interest in promoting its big
game management policies*t The goal should be, and must be under a
dormant Commerce Clause analysis, a system that lessens the burdens on
interstate commerce and still effectively meets Wyoming's interests.
A market-driven system achieves this goal.t " The small number of
licenses that Wyoming allocates to nonresidents would no longer determine
interstate commerce in outfitting services across Wyoming's border. A market-driven system would encourage interstate commerce because it would
provide the outfitting industry with some certainty. At the same time, this
system would meet Wyoming's interests. Conservation of big game animals
would be unaffected. Also, this system would reward resident hunters. Licenses formerly allocated only to nonresidents potentially would be available
to residents, thereby increasing the number of total licenses available to
residents.' In addition, all hunters, including residents, would benefit from
the additional license revenue received by the Department because this money
could then be used to improve existing programs and create new ones.
Many western states have license allocation schemes, including
variations on the market-driven system. I" While those schemes may or

181. Were this the outcome, the Clajon district court's statement that outfitters views may be
vindicated through the political process would be somewhat prophetic. 854 F.Supp. at 861. While the

dormant Commerce Clause can protect outfitters' interstate commerce, it does not protect outfitters'
commerce from Wyoming's allocation system, and outfitters must seek their answer in the political
arena.

182. See supra text accompanying notes 44-47.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 75-81.
184. See supra notes 166-72 and accompanying text.
185. A potential downside of a market-driven system that implements an auction system is that
hunters with the most money could out-bid other hunters.
186. See Appendix, State Licensing Systems.
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may not work for Wyoming, many illustrate alternative licensing systems
that are less susceptible to a dormant Commerce Clause challenge than is
Wyoming's current system. A market-driven system in Wyoming would
reduce the burdens on interstate commerce and substantially decrease the
number of less-burdensome alternatives. Adopting such a system would
reduce the possibility of a future dormant Commerce Clause challenge
brought by outfitters.
CONCLUSION

Wyoming's current license allocation system imposes more than an
incidental burden on interstate commerce. At best, Wyoming's goals are
only indirectly served by the regulations. The existence of numerous
alternatives that would equally serve Wyoming's interests weighs against
proponents of Wyoming's current licensing system. For these reasons, a
future dormant Commerce Clause challenge presents a threat to the constitutionality of Wyoming's system. The legislature should attempt to
avoid another challenge to Wyoming's hunting licensing system by imple-

menting a license allocation alternative.
PETER C.
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APPENDIX
STATE LICENSING SYSTEMS
Wyoming's hunting license system allocates eighty-four percent of
its limited quota elk licenses and eighty percent of its limited quota deer,
antelope and wild turkey licenses to resident hunters. Other states allocate
big game licenses in a manner that may be less burdensome on the outfitting industry than is Wyoming's system.
LESS BURDENSOME:
Colorado. Colorado's licensing system does not differentiate between
residents and nonresidents. General licenses are sold over-the-counter on
a first-come, first-served basis, regardless of the hunter's residency. Special licenses (i.e. limited quota licenses) are allocated on a preference
point system. A hunter-applicant gains a preference point each year he or
she applies for a license but does not draw his or her first-choice. All
applicants, resident and nonresident, have access to all available licenses.
Telephone Interview with Corrie Davis, Department of Natural Resources, Fort Collins, Colo., (Sept. 23, 1996).
Idaho. Idaho's licensing system provides for an outfitter set-aside license,
allocating a maximum of twenty-five percent of the total number of nonresident deer licenses and elk licenses available. These licenses are "sold
on a first-come, first-served basis, only to persons that have entered into
an agreement for that year to utilize the services of a [licensed outfitter]."
IDAHO CODE § 36-408(c) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
Montana. Montana provides for an "Outfitter-sponsored License." Under
Montana's system, a pool of licenses are reserved for hunters who contract to hunt with a licensed outfitter. MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-2-511
(1995).
Nevada. Nevada allocates sixteen percent of its nonresident deer licenses
to nonresident hunters who employ a guide. NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
502.146-. 149 (Michie 1995).
New Mexico. New Mexico allocates seventeen percent of "special drawing" (i.e., limited quota) licenses to nonresidents who contract for outfitting services with a New Mexico registered outfitter. Three percent of the
special licenses are allocated to groups comprised of New Mexico residents and nonresidents. Eighty percent of the special licenses are allocated
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to residents. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-3-16(B)(1)(2)(3)
1996).

153
(Michie Supp.

Oregon. Oregon allocates to nonresidents a maximum of five percent of
the total number of "controlled" (i.e., limited quota) deer and elk licenses
available. Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife, 1996 Oregon Big
Game Regulations, at 13. Oregon also allocates licenses to landowners
based upon the acreage controlled by the landowner. Id at 10. These licenses may be transferred to anyone, but are valid only on the property
for which they were issued. Id. Additionally, Oregon has an auction sale
and raffle for deer and elk licenses open to residents and nonresidents. Id.
at 46-47.
MORE BURDENSOME:
Arizona. Arizona allocates one-hundred percent of its big game licenses to
residents, of which up to ten percent may be allocated to nonresidents if
residents do not apply for them. Telephone Interview with George
Taulman, United States Outfitters, Inc., Taos, N.M., (Sept. 7, 1996).
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